The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied by Catlett, Fred W.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 21 Number 3 
7-1-1946 
The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent 
to Which It Should Be Applied 
Fred W. Catlett 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fred W. Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be 
Applied, 21 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 158 (1946). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol21/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT
SHOULD BE APPLIED
FRED W CATLETT
The number of recent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States overruling earlier decisions of that Court1 has profoundly dis-
turbed a large section of the bar of the United States and a considerable
number of its thoughtful citizens It has even induced protest and
caused foreboding among the members of that Court itself 2
This feeling does not arise from the fact that the bar and public are
entirely unaccustomed to reversals of its former decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States Such reversals have occurred in the past 3
But they have been by no means so frequent as within the last few years
The effect of these recent reversals has been not only to alter specific
long-established principles or interpretations of constitutions and stat-
utes, but to create a feeling of general uncertainty as to the reliance
which may be placed upon all decisional law This feeling is due to
the apparent attitude of the majority of the present Court toward
established principles Although it has rendered lip service to the
doctrine of stare decisis, 4 its opinions have given the impression to
many that it takes rather positive delight in overthrowing principles
long established and, by many, well cherished Quite naturally, then,
the question has arisen what has happened or is happening to the
doctrine of stare decisis? Is it being in effect discarded, or simply
violated? Does it still rest upon sound reason, and should any effort
be made to re-establish its authority? Can the rule as it now exists in
this country be modified in any way to the advantage of our law and
our society?
The doctrine of stare decisis, which means "to stand by decisions and
not to disturb settled matters," is of ancient lineage Some writers
find evidences of it in Bracton and in the Year Books,' although one
very careful scholar, who has gone through the Year Books for the
I U S v Darby, 312 U S 100; 85 L ed 609 (1940); Erie Railroad v
Tomkins, 304 U S 64, 82 L ed 1188 (1938); Williams v North Carolina, 317
U S 287, 87 L ed 279 (1942); Jamieson v Texas, 318 U S 413, 87 L ed 869
(1943); West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 U S 624
87 L ed 1628 (1943); U S v S E Underwriters' Assn, 322 U S 533 88 L
ed 1440 (1944) See more complete list in Smith v Allwright, 321 U S 649
88 L ed 987, 988 n 10 (1944)
2Smith v Allwright, 321 U S 649, 88 L ed 987 (1944); Mahnick v
Southern Steamship Co, 321 U S 96, 88 L ed 561 (1944); U S v S E
Underwriters' Assn, 322 U S 533, 88 L ed 1440 (1944)
1 See lists in notes to Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 U S 406-410
76 L ed 815, 823-5 (1931)
'Smith v Allwright, 321 U S 649, 88 L ed 987 (1944); Helvering v
Hallock, 309 U S 106, 84 L ed 604 at 612 (1940); Burnet v Coronado Oil
& Gas Co, 285 U S 393, 76 L ed 815 (1932)
5 ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER, STARE DEcisis, Philadelphia, Cyrus M Dixon
(1929)
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special purpose of determining to what extent the doctrine of stare
decisis was recognized in that early period, concludes that it cannot
be said that the doctrine was firmly established then 6 Other writers
have been of the opinion that the essence of the doctrine can be found
in the Roman Civil Law and even in the Code of Justinian I
The exact time when the doctrine first appeared or was definitely
accepted in English Law is of small practical importance It appeared
early and is certainly a very useful and a natural doctrine of any
system of law which is based upon usage and custom Unlike some
of the other early doctrines of the common law, it is still easy to perceive
the reasons lying at the base of stare decisis Those reasons are stability
and certainty in the law, convenience, and uniformity of treatment of
all litigants To the English or American mind, a system of law which
lacks certainty and stability would be faulty and undesirable 8 It
would be exceedingly difficult for a citizen to conduct his business or
to deal with his property or to carry on satisfactorily many of the
affairs of life, if he could not count upon the continued recognition
of the principles of law in effect when he is compelled to act It would
be impossible for a lawyer to give any dependable advice to a client
If the courts were free to apply to each particular case the personal
views of the particular judge or judges sitting, or if a judge were free
to settle controversies in accordance with his own personal desires,
the conduct of business would involve an added hazard and the decision
of controversies between litigants would lose all semblance of justice
or fairness Confidence in the honesty and integrity of the courts and
in their impartiality could not be maintained We should have a gov-
ernment of men and not of laws
The acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis was a gradual one
0T Ellis Lewis, The History of Stare Decisis (1931) 47 L Q REv 411
7 DANIEL H CHAAMERLAw, THE DocnumN oF STARE DEcIsIs, New York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co (1885)
8Ia Hole v Rittenhouse, 2 Phila 411, 417-418, appears this forceful
statement:
"The majority of this court changes on the average once every nine
years, without counting the changes of death and resignation If each
new set of judges shall consider themselves at liberty to overthrow the
doctrine of their predecessors, our system of jurisprudence (if system
it can be called) would be the most fickle, uncertain and vicious that
the civilized world ever saw A French constitution, or a South Ameri-
can republic, or a Mexican administration, would be an immortal
thing in comparison to the short-lived principles of Pennsylvania law.
The rules of property which ought to be as steadfast as the hills, will
become as unstable as the waves To avoid this great calamity, I know
of no recourse but that of stare decisis I claim nothing for the great
men who have gone before us on the score of their marked and mani-
fest superiority But I would stand by their 'decisions, because they have
passed into the law and become part of it-have been relied and acted
on-and rights have grown up under them which it is unjust and cruel
to take away"
See also McLoud, The Value of Precedent (1894) 28 Am L Rv 218
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Assertions of the doctrine can be found in the Year Books9 and un-
doubtedly it increased in strength and acceptance by the courts as
experience drove home to the judges and the people the very sound
reasons which justified it It was not, however, until the latter half
of the nineteenth century that even in England the doctrine became
established in its most rigid form 10 At the present time, a decision
by the final court of appeal in England upon a point raised in a case
before the court and actually passed upon and decided by the court,
is regarded as binding, not only upon all inferior courts but upon
the appellate court itself, if and when the same point is presented to it
The rule established can be changed only by an act of Parliament
The real test of the doctrine arises, of course, only when the judges
in a given case are convinced that the rule established by the earlier
decision is wrong and yet apply it in the case before them Contrary
to the weight of authority in the United States, the House of Lords
has applied its rigid doctrine of stare decisis even where the earlier
decision was made by an evenly divided court, the effect of the even
division being an affirmance of the judgment of the lower court "I
It does not appear that the courts of the United States ever accepted
the rigid doctrine now held by the English courts 12 A distinguished
scholar, nevertheless, is authority for the statement that, on the whole,
the stare decisis doctrine in the United States approximated that of
the English courts up to the beginning of the twentieth century He
says that, beginning with that century, a decided difference appeared
in the attitude of the courts toward the maxim, and that this change
of attitude may be attributed to what Dean Pound characterizes as the
"socialization of the law "13
If the doctrine of the American courts is not the rigid one of the
English courts, it becomes important to determine just what the
American doctrine is There have been various attempts to phrase it
Two of those attempts seem to have been more successful than the
others and have produced definitions which have received wide approval
The first is the definition by Kent "
0 Supra, note 6
'10Attorney Gen v Windsor, 8 H L Cases 389; 11 Eng Rep 481 (1860)
Beamish v Beamish, 9 H L Cases 274; 11 Eng Rep 481 (1861) London
Street Tramways, Ltd v The London County Council, 1898 App Cas 37511 Beamish v. Beamish, supra
1 Gray, Judicial Precedents (1895) 9 HARV L REv 27
""Albert Kocourek and Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law
Through Stare Decisis (1934) 29 ILL L REv 971; Arthur L Goodhart, Case
Law in England and America (1929) 15 CoRN L Q 173
U I KENT's COVIMENTARIES (14th ed 1896) 475 If the previous decision
has been made in the same case, it becomes the "law of the case" and is
generally regarded as absolutely binding Gange Lumber Co v Rowley,
22 Wn (2d) 250, 155 P (2d) 802 (1945) But see Johnson v Cadillac Motor
Co, 261 Fed 878, 886 (1919) It is also almost the universal rule that an
inferior court is bound by the decisions of the superior court until it is
overruled But see Barnette v West Virginia State Board of Education 47
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"A solemn decision upon a point of law arising in any
given case becomes an authority in a like case because it is
the highest evidence which we can have of the law applicable
to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision
so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that
the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular
case 
)y
The second definition, formulated by Daniel H Chamberlain in a
prize essay written in 1885 for the New York State Bar Association,
reads as follows:
"That a deliberate or solemn decision of a court or judge
made after argument on a question of law fairly arising in a
case and necessary to its determination is an authority or
binding precedent in the same court or in other courts of equal
or lower rank in subsequent cases where 'the very point'
is again in controversy; but that the degree of authority be-
longing to such a precedent depends of necessity on its agree-
ment with the spirit of the times or the judgment of subsequent
tribunals upon its correctness as a statement of the existing
or actual law; and that the compulsion or exigency of the
doctrine is, in the last analysis, moral and intellectual rather
than arbitrary or inflexible '15
This last statement, it will be observed, was framed prior to the
lessened emphasis upon the maxim observed in the decisions after
the beginning of the twentieth century An examination of the author-
ities leads to the conclusion that this statement rather accurately sum-
marizes the American doctrine then and today
The acceptance of this statement, however, as the true rule of stare
decisis in this country will lead to confusion in thought unless one
is careful to observe that on many occasions a judge or an author,
when referring to the rule by name, has in mind the inflexible rule
of the English courts When the United States Supreme Court, for
instance, has said, as it frequently has, that the doctrine is not in-
flexible or inexorable, it has reference to the strict rule, for the flex-
ibility of the stated rule is perfectly obvious
The American rule, then, does not destroy the value of prior deci-
sions nor deny that they should be regarded as controlling until author-
Fed. Supp 251 (D C 1942), where the district court refused to follow a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States The situation,
however, was extraordinary Four of the seven judges of the U S Supreme
Court who had participated in the decision of the case of Minersville School
Dist v Gobitis, 310 U S 686, 84 L ed 1375 (1939), had given public
expression of their disapproval of the decision, the chief justice in hisdissenting opinion, and three other justices in a special dissenting opinion
in Jones v City of Opelika, 316 U S 584, 86 L ed 1691, 1715 (1941) The
lower court guessed correctly and was affirmed in West Virginia State
Board v Barnette, 319 U S 624, 87 L ed. 1628 (1942) But see comment in
note on case in (1943) 57 HaRv L REv 652, 654
21 Supra note 7
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itatively reversed Mr Justice Brandeis, one of the early leaders
in the attack upon the rigid rule, has said:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right This is commonly
true, even where the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation "16
And Mr Justice Cardozo, another acknowledged liberal, has written
in his masterful essay on "The Nature of the Judicial Process":
"I think adherence to precedent should be the rule and not
the exception "1
If, then, the binding effect of precedent is to be recognized as the
general rule, when or under what circumstances is it to be disregarded?
In the first place, it is agreed that a previous decision, to be binding,
must be upon the identical point of law involved in the succeeding case
In the English courts, the emphasis seems to have been placed upon
the decision of the earlier court and not upon the reasons given for it
In the United States, although greater consideration has been given
to the opinion, it is likewise the actual decision which governs I
As a corollary, it is also generally agreed that the decision of the
court upon a point not properly before it and not actually raised in
the case is not binding as a precedent; 19 obiter dicta are in no wise
controlling It would seem that one decision on a particular point should
constitute a sufficient precedent,20 but that has not been the view of
some courts 21.
The prevailing American view is that a decision of a court is but
evidence of the law 22 If so, it may be weighed like any other evidence
If it is by a divided court, if there be vigorous dissenting opinions,
if it be a single decision,'2 a case of first impression, or one of a line
of cases, if it be a decision of long standing, or a recent one upon which
"I Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 U S 405; L ed 815 (1931)
See Smith v Allwright, 313 U S 299, 88 L ed 709 (1944); Louis B Boudin,
The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Constitutional Theory (1931) 8 N
Y U L Q REV 589
17 BENJAMIN CARDozo THE NATURE OF £HE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Yale Univ
Press (1921), 149
18 Max Radin Case Law and Stare Decisis (1933) 33 COL L REV 210;
John C Gardner A Comparison of the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent in
American Law and in Scots Law (1940) 52 JURIDICAL REv 144; Herman Oli-
phant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 14 A B A J 71, 159
19In re Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa 439, 153 Atl 739 (1931); Swetland v
Curtiss Airport Corp, 41 F (2d) 929 (1930); Koerner v St Louis Car Co
209 Mo 141, 107 S W 481 (1907); Ingham v Harper & Son 71 Wash 286
128 Pac 675 (1912); State ex rel Todd v Yelle, 7 Wn (2d) 443 110 P (2d)
162 (1941)
20 Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis (1933) 33 COL L REV 201
21 Quaker Realty Co v Labasse, 131 La 996, 60 So 661, 665 (1913);
McDonald v Davey, 22 Wash 366, 60 Pac 1116 (1900)
221 BLACKSTONE (Cooley's 4th ed ) 63
23 Raphael v Morris Plan Industrial Bank (C C A, 2d Cir) 146 F (2d)
340 (1944)
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the public has bad no time to act, if the opinion is written by a judge
of acknowledged ability or eminence, its importance as a precedent may
be increased or diminished
In addition, the weight to be given to a previous decision is affected
greatly by the character of the question which has been decided If
the rule in question is a rule of property or a rule affecting trade, business
or commerce, in reliance upon which the people have acted for a long
period of time, the courts are slow to upset it 24 If the matter is one
which can be easily changed by the legislature and the legislature has
had an opportunity to act and has not done so, the courts will assume
that the earlier rule has not been found unsatisfactory 25
In criminal cases, a change in an applicable rule has the appearance
of ex post facto legislation In interpreting a criminal statute, therefore,
the court is very likely to regard the former interpretation as having
become in effect a part of the statute and not thereafter subject to
change by the court- 6 The same principle has been applied to the
interpretation of other types of statutes upon which the business com-
munity can be said to have relied 27 On the other hand, on questions
of procedure or evidence, our courts have felt less firmly bound by
prior decisions 281
It is on questions of constitutional law, however, that the courts of
this country have been most ready to decline to follow precedent
Justice Brandeis has expressed the feeling of many of the judges,
including the majority of the present United States Supreme Court:29
"But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible,
this court has often overruled its earlier decisions The court
bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing, recognizing that the process of trial and error so fruitful
2 Hines v Driver, 89 Ind 339 (1883); Diamond Plate Glass Co v. Knote,
38 Ind App 20, 71 N E 954 (1906); American Mortgage Co v Hopper,
64 Fed 553 (1894); Treon v Brown, 14 Ohio 482 (1846); Newberry v Trow-
bridge, 4 Mich 390 (1857); Liberty National Bank v Loomis, 275 Ky 445,
121 S W (2d) 947 (1938); Boca v. Chavez, 32 N M 189, 252 Pac 987 (1927);
Wisconsin Power & Light Co v. Beloit, 215 Wis 349, 254 N W 119 (1903);
Shoemaker v Cincinnati, 68 Ohio St 603, 68 N E 1 (1903)
2-1But see criticism of this assumption by Mr Justice Frankfurter in
Helvering v Hallock, 309 U S 106, 84 L ed 604 (1934)2
6 Robert Freemen, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Op-
eration of an Overruling Decision (1918) 18 COL L REV. 230; Florida Forest
& Park Service v Strickland, 154 Fla 472, 18 S. (2d) 152 (1944); State v
Mellenberger, 163 Ore. 103, 95 P (2d) 709 (1944); 128 A. L R 1506, dis-
tinguishing between offenses malum in se and malum prohibitum; Common-
wealth v Trousdale, 297 Ky 724, 181 S W (2d) 254 (1944)
27 Pouch v Prudential Ins Co, 204 N. Y 281, 97 N. E 731 (1912); Yakima
Valley Bank & Trust Co v Yakima County, 149 Wash 552, 271 Pac 820(1928); Falconer v Simmons, 51 W Va 172, 41 S E 193 (1902)
28State v Brunn, 22 Wn.(2d) 120, 154 P (2d) 826 (1945), overruling
earlier cases on the meaning of "double jeopardy"; Whittaker v Lane,
128 Va 317, 104 S E 252 (1920)
20 Supra note 14.
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in the physical sciences is appropriate also in the judicial
functions
"In cases involving the Federal Constitution, the position
of this court is unlike that of the highest court of England,
where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly
applied to all classes of cases Parliament is free to correct
any judicial error and the remedy may be promptly invoked
The reasons why this court should refuse to follow an earlier
Constitutional decision which it deems erroneous are particu-
larly strong where the question presented is one of applying,
as distinguished from what may be called interpreting, the
Constitution "
Admittedly, it would be much simpler if the courts in this country
felt free to adopt the stringent rule of the English courts and hold
fast to the former decision, leaving it to the legislature to make any
desired changes But here changes are not so readily made Legislatures
are not always in session and, indeed, in most states meet but once in
every two years Constitutional changes are much more difficult And,
although courts do not often expressly admit it, many of them doubtless
indulge in the belief that they are better equipped to determine the
correct principle of law than is the legislature For these reasons, the
rigid doctrine has not been regarded as suited to American conditions,
and is not likely to be
Many authors and judges have undertaken to state the conditions
justifying a departure from the basic rule of stare decisis Blackstone
says: 
30
"Yet this rule admits of exception when the former deter-
mination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more
if it be clearly contrary to the divine law"
As appeared in his definition previously set forth, Kent would apply
the general rule "unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood
or misapplied in that particular case " Likewise, in the rule as for-
mulated by Mr Chamberlain, the degree of authority belonging to
a precedent depends "on its agreement with the spirit of the times and
the judgment of subsequent tribunals upon its correctness as a state-
ment of existing or actual law " In the last analysis, he says the
compulsion of the doctrine is only "moral and intellectual " Judge
Robert von Moschzisker, in his excellent essay on "Stare Decisis, ,"I
expresses the belief that earlier decisions should be reversed when the
court can say "practically beyond reasonable doubt that they were
wrongly decided and the ends of justice require their overruling " The
court in subsequent cases ought not to disturb its prior decision "except
for very cogent reasons and on a clear conviction of error " Later in
the same article, he says that the earlier decision should stand unless
30 Supra note 20
31 Supra note 5
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the court believes "the prior ruling to be wrong or that it has become
inapplicable through lapse of time and change of conditions" Many
state supreme courts have expressed similar views 82
The most authoritative statements, hotvever, appear in late cases
in the Supreme Court of the United States Chief Justice Stone has said
that "before overruling a precedent in any case, it is the duty of the
court to make certain that more harm will not be done in rejecting
than in retaining a rule of even dubious validity," and "these con-
siderations might well stay a reversal of long established doctrine which
promises so little advantage and so much of harm" In the same case,
Mr Justice Jackson wrote, "Judgment as to when the evil of a decisional
error exceeds the evil of an innovation must be based on very practical,
and, in part, on policy considerations "88 And Mr Justice Frankfurter
has declared that the doctrine, which is one of social policy, should
be departed from when adherence to a former decision "involves col-
lision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience ,,3, In an earlier case, Mr Justice
Brandeis gave it as his opinion that whether the prior decision "shall
be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discre-
tion of the court" 3r Many other attempts to state the circumstances
or conditions under which a court is justified in refusing to follow prior
decisions have been made, but they have been no more helpful than
those quoted
Such a situation is unsatisfactory to the person who demands cer-
tainty Nevertheless, the decisions of the courts and the statements
of the judges foreclose any conclusion other than that the recognition
of the binding effect of a prior decision ultimately depends only upon
the sound judicial discretion of the particular court The sole protec-
tion against the frequent exercise of the undoubted power to overrule
prior decisions is to be found in the court's "own sense of self-re-
straint "38 Admittedly, the reasons inducing the court to disregard a
3 Adams Express Co v Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N E 300 (1919);
IN. re Hood River, 114 Ore 112, 227 Pae 1065 (1924); State ex rel. La Brode
v. Cox, 43 Ariz. 174, 30 P (2d) 825 (1934); Commonwealth v Walsh, 196
Mass 369, 82 N. E. 19, 18 Ann Cas. 842 (1907); McGregor v Providence
Trust, 119 la 718, 162 So. 323 (1935); State ex -'el Blodel v. Savage, 144
Wash. 302, 258 Pac 1 (1927); Riedling v Harrod, 298 Ky 232, 182 S W (2d)
770 (1944)Uo  S v Southeastern Underwriters Assn, 322 U S 533, 88 L ed 1440
(1944).84 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U S 106, 119, 84 L ed 604 (1940).
'8Burnet v Coronado Oi1 & Gas Co, 285 U S 393, 406, 76 L ed 815(1932)
"The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and
uniformity of decision, is not inflexible Whether it shall be followed
or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court which s again called upon to consider a question once decided"
Mr Justice Lurton in Hertz v Woodman, 218 U S 205, 212, 54 L ed.
1001 (1910)
3, Stone, C J, in U S v Butler, 297 U S 1, 78, 80 L ed. 477 (1936)
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prior holding should be cogent and convincing The court should be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the earlier decision was wrong
It should weigh the considerations on both sides and must in the end
decide the question whether more harm is to be done by standing
by the rule already laid down or by overruling the earlier case and
announcing a new rule The unavoidable difficulty is that different
judges will give different weights to the several considerations If dis-
satisfaction with the former rule is very great, a judge will be likely
to conclude that the evils resulting from a change of the rule are less
than from its maintenance Certain judges, because of their education,
or political or social philosophy, or individual temperaments, place
less weight upon precedents and the value of certainty in the law than
others As Justice Brandeis has emphasized, where decisions are a
combination of facts and law, judges who take an opposite view of
the facts will not be likely to feel bound to follow prior decisions
They would undoubtedly insist that the same principle of law is being
applied to different conditions and deny that the doctrine of stare
decisis was being in any way departed from In cases of that sort,
it is not surprising that we should find judges today not only ready
but at times even anxious to overrule the earlier decisions Perhaps
certain judges are a bit overconfident of the possession of wisdom
superior to that of the judges who have gone before them On the other
hand, no age of society should be absolutely chained to the past A
great jurist has well stated the modern American view: 8
"I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested
by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the
sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be
less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment We
have had to do this sometimes in the field of constitutional law
Perhaps we should do so oftener in fields of private law where
considerations of social utility are not so aggressive and in-
sistent There should be greater readiness to abandon an un-
tenable position when the rule to be discarded may not reason-
ably be supposed to have determined the conduct of the liti-
gants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product
of institutions or conditions which have gained a new sig-
nificance or development with the progress of the years
"If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their
day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours,
they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their
successors "
Many of the decisions overruling earlier decisions in recent times
have been on constitutional questions In a number of cases, the result
of the change or decision has been to extend the federal power or to
37 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, TaE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, New Haven,
Yale Univ Press, 160
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strike down limitations upon the power of the states 38 This type of
case furnishes special justification for disregard of the general rule
Constitutional revision, particularly United States constitutional re-
vision, is a difficult matter requiring a number of years for its accom-
plishment It is extremely doubtful whether a change in constitutional
interpretation can be effected by legislative action A period anxious
for social change is unwilling to walt such a length of time to accom-
plish what it strongly believes to be beneficent results A form of
government, if it is to exist for a long period of time, must be flexible
enough to permit within it such change and growth If ft does not, and
such change or growth cannot be accomplished by peaceable methods,
the form of government is likely to prove unsatisfactory and be basic-
ally altered Fortunately, the Constitution of the United States, a brief
document and phrased in general terms, has permitted such a growth
within those terms, and undoubtedly some of that growth has been
made possible by the overruling of previously limiting constitutional
decisions
It would have been possible for the American courts to have taken
a view intermediate between the present rigid English doctrine and
the flexible American one American courts could have relaxed the
rule in cases of constitutional interpretation or application, and held
to the strict rule in all other cases, They could have said that it was
the province of the legislature to make laws; that if the legislature did
not like rules of conduct laid down by the courts, it could change
them; that it was more important to have the law certain than to have
it at all times theoretically right Such a rule would be more easily
applied than the one now followed by our courts, and much can be
said in its favor But the fact is that the American courts have not
taken this intermediate position
An unfortunate logical consequence of an overruling decision under
presend legal theory is its retroactive effect Parties who have dealt in
reliance upon the earlier decision suddenly find that the law upon
which they had a right to rely has been changed Acts which were at
the time they were committed legal may suddenly turn out to have
been illegal 30
The courts have tried to avoid this injustice in various ways 40 In
the case of the interpretation of statutes, they have established the
doctrine that the construction of a statute by the court becomes in
effect a part of that statute 4 It cannot be changed except by act
as West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 U S 379, 81 L ed 703 (1937);
U S v Darby, 312 U S 100, 85 L. ed. 609 (1941); Erie Railroad Co. v
Tompkins, 304 U S 64, 82 L ed 1188 (1938); Smith v Alwright, 321 U S
649, 88 L ed 987 (1946)
:9 Supra note 280 Supra note 24
"Henges v Dentler, 33 Pa 496 (1858); Farrior v New England Mort
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of the legislature This is particularly true of penal statutes Some
courts have applied the old law to the case at bar but announced that
in the future they would apply a new rule 42 Sometimes the courts have
clung to the old rule in the case before them but called the attention
of the legislature to the fact that the court believed the rule to be
wrong and suggested its change by the legislature
It has been advocated also by certain writers that the courts can
protect against such injustices, either by changing their view that the
decision of a court is merely evidence of the law and regarding their
decision as actually establishing the law, in which case a change of
decision would merely mean a change of the law in the future; or,
without changing their view of the nature of court decisions, they
could adopt the principle that their decisions as to the law should have
no retroactive effect The great objection voiced to the latter suggestion
is that such action would be nothing but sheer judicial legislation, to
which, however, the rather effective answer has been made:
"If overruling a prior decision has not been condemned as
amounting to judicial legislation, it is difficult to see how
giving an overruling decision prospective effect only would he
any more a matter of legislation "43
The conclusions which have been reached as to the rule of stare
decisis in this country and its proper application will not satisfy the
mind which seeks certainty Nor can it be denied that there is apparent
in the courts of last resort, at the present time, less regard for precedent
and prior decision and a greater inclination to examine a question anew
in the light of present day conditions, and to reverse the former holding
if it appears to establish what seems now to be an undesirable principle
or rule We even find courts going so far as to state that they are not
bound by their own prior decisions 41 It is this apparent tendency in
many quarters on the part of the courts to throw off all restraints, and
act in disregard of precedents, that has alarmed the major portion of
the membership of the bar, which is convinced that any satisfactory
legal system must have a consistent element of stability
It has been suggested in high quarters that the cause for this lessened
respect for precedent is the tremendous output of judicial decisions
It is said that the multiplication of precedents is having the same effect
upon their value as inflation has, or would have, upon the value of the
Security Co, 92 Ala 176, 9 So 532 (1891); Gelpecke v Dubuque, 1 Wall 175,
17 L ed 520 (1864); Douglas v Pike County, 25 L ed 968 (1880); Loeb v
Trustees of Columbia Township, 179 U S 472, 45 L ed 280 (1900)
42 State v Bell, 136 N C 674, 49 S E 163 (1904); State v Longine, 109
Miss 125, 67 So 902 (1915) See also Great Northern Ry Co v Sunburst
Oil & Refining Co , 287 U S 358, 77 L ed 360, 85 A L R 262 (1932)
"'Albert Kocourek and Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law
Through Stare Decisis (1935) 29 ILL L Rav 971, at 996
" In re Mitchell, 61 Ariz 436, 150 P (2d) 355 (1944)
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dollar It is doubtless true that the great increase in the number of
judicial opinions has had the effect of depreciating the value of prece-
dent The real cause, however, would seem to lie much deeper We
are in a period of great social and political change Conceptions which
have seemed to many established and fundamental have been ques-
tioned and modified or discarded There is no longer, even among
lawyers, as general agreement as there was in the earlier dqays upon
fundamental legal and political principles These changes were beginning
to be felt in the latter part of the last century, but it has not been
until comparatively recent years that individuals imbued with the new
views have, in large numbers, obtained positions on our courts In the
last decade, such a change has occurred in the Supreme Court of the
United States and in the Federal courts, and also in some of the courts
of last resort in the states, and these judges are writing their new
ideas into our law Are we not, then, only viewing the age-long process
of growth or adaptation? A change in law is simply reflecting a change
in the thinking of many, if not a majority, of our people Indeed, it
would be rather difficult to prove that the American rule of stare
decisis is being violated The whole problem must be viewed in proper
perspective Precedent still governs in most of the law's domain Even
the judges who are presenting the new social views are giving allegiance
to it, and it is highly probable that if there should be a swing in the
political pendulum, these same judges would be heard extolling the
virtues of the rules of stare decisis in protection of the decisions which
they have rendered
Undoubtedly, too, the methods of teaching in our law schools have
tended to produce the result we are observing The case system and
the critical analysis of all decisions and the thorough examination of
the reasons which lie behind them, all tend to lessen the respect for
the omniscience of judges and the authority of precedent
If one is to judge from the opinions of our courts, no change in the
doctrine of stare decisis..as formulated in America, is likely It is pos-
sible that the courts will go further than they have gone in protecting
against the unjust retroactive effect of overruling decisions The one
effective action which the bar can take is to undertake to develop among
its members a stronger sentiment that more careful consideration should
be given to the principles and rules which have existed for years before
it is decided to overturn them It is possible that recently appointed
or elected judges have given too little weight to the value of certainty
and stability in the law and have been too eager to accomplish by
judicial decision social changes which they considered desirable and
which they were unwilling to entrust to the somewhat slower process
of legislation The creation of such a sentiment would, in time, have
" Mr Justice Jackson In (1944) 30 A B A. J, 334-5
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its effect, for the judges come from members of the bar The law
schools might also be encouraged to emphasize to a greater extent the
value of precedent and the disadvantage of frequent changes in decisional
law Without question, a proximate cause of the present weakened
state of health of the doctrine of stare decisis is the presence upon our
courts of men whose experience in law has been largely academic If
results along these lines can be accomplished, it is believed the present
flexible rule of stare decisis will prove to be as practical a solution of the
problem as can be found 4
46 In commenting upon the decision in Johnson v Cadillac Motor Co,
261 Fed 878 (1919), Judge Cardozo well stated the problem:
"The conclusion of the majority of the court, whether right or wrong,
is interesting as evidence of a spirit and tendency to subordinate precedent
to justice How to reconcile that tendency, which is a growing and in the
main a wholesome one, with the need of uniformity and certainty, is one
of the great problems confronting the lawyers and judges of our day We
shall have to feel our way here as elsewhere in the law Somewhere be-
tween worship of the past and exaltation of the present, the path of safety
will be found" BENJAMIN CARDozo THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,
Yale Univ Press (1942), 149
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